The development of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in Russia has evoked significant discussion in the United States among scholars, in the mass media, and within U.S. governmental circles.  No matter which audience one chooses, one can find within it at least two contending views expressed about Russia’s democratic future—one based on fear and the other based on hope.  This article argues that both schools of thought need to form their arguments on more concrete information than exists at present, although it seems clear that the NGO segment of Russian civil society is becoming more and more dynamic.
Two Contending Groups
The first group claims that the NGO movement is in danger because of the establishment of the “power vertical” in Russia since Vladimir Putin became president.  The law on political parties, the new way in which Russian governors are chosen, and the apparent more central control of some elements of the Russian mass media, provides part of the evidence for this group’s view that Russians are losing their freedoms.  The new law on NGOs and the establishment of the Public Chamber in 2006 provide further speculation that Russian authorities are repressing NGOs.  This group’s reactions can border on near hysteria, especially among some in the American mass media, who have claimed that the new NGO law will lead to the shutting down of all foreign NGOs and the suppression of Russian domestic ones.   Some members of this group begin their analyses of Russia with the assumption that “Russia is not a democracy.”
            The second group, however, counters the first with the assertion that democratic theory is partly based on the notion that the number of political parties needs to be limited (as in the Russia law on parties) to make electoral choices comprehensible to citizens.  Russia’s federation, moreover, needs to be centralized following the radical de-centralization during the Yeltsin years to yield a more rational way of governing the huge country.  The new law on NGOs and the creation of the Public Chamber do not, in principle, violate any democratic norms and may actually end up protecting Russian NGOs from government excesses at both the regional and national levels.  The NGO law, this group states, is not much different from similar legislation in other, democratic nations, such as India, Great Britain, and the United States, itself.
            The present author finds himself much more part of the second group than the first, being convinced that the first group founds itself partly on parochial, American concepts of what democracy should be and a non-comparative view of Russian democratic progress.  In addition, evidence that the author has collected about NGO activity at the regional level indicates that Russian NGOs are becoming effective organizations and are having a positive impact on Russian democracy.  Nevertheless, he also has come to understand that there is a strong need for more evidence about Russia’s NGO development.  Such evidence can come from two general sources:  broad, aggregate data about Russian NGOs and information drawn from the intensive study of NGOs at the local and regional levels.  The remainder of this article will discuss problems with aggregate evidence only.
The Number of Russian NGOs
By 2003 approximately 570,000 NGOs existed in Russia, according to one Russian source .  This number is up considerably from the approximately 8,500 registered groups in 1993, the 160,000 in 1997 and the nearly 275,000 in 2000 .  The number of registered NGOs reported in any year varies because of the difficulty in obtaining official data and the consequent need to rely on secondary sources of information, such as the United States Information Agency (USIA) or reports of official information from Russian secondary sources.  Sources often contradict each other.  For instance, Sarah Henderson’s reported 275,000 in 2000 do not match a 2000 estimate from a Russian source reporting 484,949 NGOs  (it cites the Russian statistical agency, Goskomstat, as its source) .  Different estimates include different kinds of groups as NGOs, which may account for the variation.  The referenced Goskomstat figures count municipal organizations, consumer groups, and foundations as well as charitable organizations, many of which are not normally figured in the term NGO.
There can be no question about the tremendous national growth of NGOs, no matter what the inaccuracies.  The present author has calculated four different estimates of the total number of NGOs up to 2005, all of which begin with Sarah Henderson’s first two approximations from 1993 and 1997 and then use data for more current years from different Russian sources.  Using linear regression (линейная регрессия) we arrive at four approximations for 2005:  465,005 NGOs; 370,148 NGOs; 771,424 NGOs; and 616,344 NGOs.  The average number for 2005 is:  555,730 NGOs.  Similarly, the four sets of figures yield averages of 328,050 NGOs for 2000 and 133,756 NGOs for 1996.  It would be useful to have a dependable source of official data and not have to deal with the approximations. NGOs are required to register with the Ministry of Justice, but the Ministry does not make the data available on its web site.  Moreover, Goskomstat is supposed to publish the data, but they are not included on any web site or in its publication, Rossiiskii statisticheskii ezhegodnik.   
Adding to these difficulties are other data problems.  First, the overall totals are not disaggregated into useful categories.  The 2000 Goskomstat data report that there are 144,000 “religious and social organizations,” but no indication of the proportions of various religious denominations or how a social organization is defined.   Second, the number of reported NGOs usually includes only registered NGOs and does not attempt to estimate the number of unregistered ones.  The present author’s own anecdotal evidence, from conversations with Russian NGO specialists and workers, indicates there are many unregistered groups, which either do not bother to register or do not have to register, so the numbers may be much higher—but by how much it is not possible, at present, to know.  Third, the NGOs actually classified as “active” NGOs are less than the reported number because, although a group is registered, it may be dormant.  But we also cannot determine how many are dormant.  Fourth, national level estimates are not disaggregated by region so it is difficult to get a precise fix on regional growth, unless one goes to regions to collect information, and then it may not be official data, just approximations.  None of these qualifications, however, nullifies the original conclusion:  the growth of NGOs at the national level has been phenomenal since the fall of the USSR, yielding strong evidence that this sector of Russian civil society is healthy, indeed.
Approximately three to seven percent of the entire population of Russia is involved in civil society development, comparable, in some ways, to proportions in democratic nations of earlier years, where, in 1980, participation exclusively in public interest groups in the United States, Britain, France, and Germany was not very different from the Russian figure, even though the rate has increased since.   Overall participation rates in the U.S. for all types of NGOs, however, including church membership and all sorts of voluntary associations, are much larger than the Russian figures.
The patterns of rapid growth at the national level are repeated when examining NGO development at the regional level, although the caveats about data limitations apply here, as well (local authorities appear to regard NGO data as a state secret).  In Samara, for instance, NGOs have increased from about 20 NGOs in 1990, to 700 in 1996, 2300 in 2000, and, again using linear regression to approximate current levels,  nearly 4000 in 2005.   The top types of NGOs in Samara in 2003 were those dealing with social protection of certain population groups, such as children and the handicapped (32% of the total); sports and health care (18%); culture, art, history (9%); science, education, ecology (8%); human rights (6%); and professional associations (5%).  
Even before outside funding for NGOs came to Novgorod in 1997, the number of NGOs increased sixteen times between 1991 and 1996, helping to demonstrate that interest articulation by the population naturally occurred in the post-Soviet era in that city (a similar pattern is true for Samara).  By 1996, there were 372 registered NGOs; by 2000, 1208; and by 2005, 1565, using regression. .  The groups experiencing the greatest growth by 2001 were political groups, including parties (39%); groups for the disabled (22%); human and civil rights organizations (17%); ecological groups (11%); and women’s associations (11%). These data are not directly comparable to Samara’s because they examine different categories and because the data give only groups experiencing growth, not absolute numbers.  Nevertheless, the range of concerns in the two cities is similar, particularly those surrounding the disabled, ecology and human rights. 
Volgograd data are available, as well, but they cover only up to 1999 and more recent data are not possible to obtain.  Nevertheless, they indicate much of what has been noted before: a total increase in numbers over time.    As above, the groups tend to concentrate on assistance to invalids (29%) but also cultural-educational activity (25%), work with children and teenagers (23%), social and economic assistance to the unemployed (12%), assistance to pensioners and veterans (11%).  It is difficult to compare group activity from city to city, but it seems clear that social protection stands out as the clear emphasis upon which regional and local NGOs place their efforts.
It is useful to add a final note on why the data for regional growth of NGOs are so important and why national-level data are not sufficient to get a picture of the development of civil society in Russia today.  Aside from the obvious intrinsic interest to see what is going on at the local levels, knowing about regional NGO growth in particular cities can tell us about whether cities are influential in spreading NGO activity throughout the country.  NGO activity in cities and oblasts, such as the ones listed above, can—and does—spread  influence outwards to the surrounding countryside, providing an example for others to follow and generating an impact beyond the region’s boundaries.  If enough cities and oblasts perform this function, then it could cause a rapid acceleration of NGO growth even beyond that expected.  This phenomenon is known as the “tipping point,” made famous by Malcolm Gladwell, which has been applied to the analysis of one particular NGO’s activities in Moscow. The tipping point could help partly to explain why Russia’s NGO growth has been so explosive—and also so apparently conducive to Russian democratic development.
Other Measures of NGO Development
Two other aggregate measures of Russian NGO development deserve mention here:  the Freedom House Freedom in the World survey and USAID’s NGO Sustainability Index.   Both are indexes intended to measure the aggregate performance of freedom, in the case of Freedom House, and NGO sustainability, for USAID.  A part of Freedom House’s measures, called civil liberties, is very similar to the USAID’s sustainability statistic.  Happily, they are graded on the same scale:  from 1, indicating high scores (the highest degree of freedom or the highest degree of sustainability) to 7 (the lowest of both measures).   They use the panel method to generate the measures in which experts assign scores to various indicators of freedom or sustainability.  They also are comparative measures in a number of senses:  the indexes can be compared to each other; they both look at a number of countries for each index (192 for Freedom House; 26 for USAID), so one can compare Russia to other nations; and the indexes can be used to compare Russia over time (since 1991 for Freedom House; since 1996 for USAID).
Thus, the indicators can provide a rich source of data for the analyst attempting to see how Russia’s democracy is progressing.  Freedom House assigns summary characterizations about how a nation is scoring in a particular year. It is “free” (1.0-2.5), “partly free” (3.0-5.0), or “not free” (5.5-7.0).  For 2004, Freedom House ranked Russia as “not free” for the first time (with an overall score of 5.5, but with civil liberties sub-score of 5.0).  In 2000, Russia was assigned an overall score of 5.0, with civil liberties also obtaining 5.0; in 1996, Russia received a 3.5, with civil liberties at 4.0.  In other words, Russia’s scores on freedom declined over time, from “partly free” to “not free,” although its civil liberties score, most comparable to USAID’s index, remained at the “partly free” level.
USAID has its own naming scheme for the NGO sustainability index.  Countries with a score of 1-3 are in a period of democratic “consolidation”; 3-5, in “mid-transition”; and 5-7, in “early transition.”  In 2004, Russia scored 4.2, slightly improved from the 4.4 of 2003.  In 2000, the score equaled 4.3 and in 1997, 3.4.  Overall there is a slight trend toward higher (worse) scores, although Russia remains in “mid-transition” for the whole period.
Comparing these indexes, it appears that, on both, Russia’s overall context for NGO development is worsening—Russia’s civil liberties are decreasing, as its sustainability, although there is an improvement for sustainability in 2004.  There are some limitations to be kept in mind when using them:

What, then, can be concluded about aggregate measures of NGO activity that underlie assessments of Russian civil society?  First, the measures of NGO growth are subject to many inaccuracies.  It is not yet possible to get official, Russian data of registered groups.  It is more difficult to get estimates of the number of groups that are not registered.  Different secondary sources yield different numbers.  Although we cannot be precise in knowing just how many NGOs exist in Russia, there can be little question that they have grown remarkably in number since the USSR collapsed, indicating progress in Russian civil society.  Second, aggregate measures of the trends in civil society development (freedom, sustainability) also suffer from inaccuracies.  But the tendencies indicate that the context in which the NGO community operates is not as hospitable as it once was. 
The reader may be excused for wondering what to make of these apparent contradictions in the quantitative indicators indicating a growing NGO community within a more hostile context.  It could be that NGOs are growing in spite of pressures from the center and elsewhere, showing just how strong the movement has become.  Yet, the assessment could also conclude that broad tendencies in political and social development are running against NGOs and that eventually civil society will be threatened.  Much more work needs to be done to develop accurate measurements of NGO development at the aggregate level.  This need is probably more important for Russian researchers and policy analysts than it is for American ones.