One of President Vladimir Putin’s most misunderstood policies has been his approach to the conflict in Chechnya. Unfortunately many correspondents attempt to mold the reality in the Caucasus into the classic situation of a major power bullying one of its rogue provinces, whose people only desire a breath of sovereignty to rid themselves of exploitation. The truth, however, does not fit any standard model, nor can it be formed or simplified into a bestseller plot about a nationalistic, democracy-hating tyrant reigning in the wary constituents of his fallen empire.

To analyze the Kremlin’s current strategy in the Caucasus, we must examine several important facts that are too often overlooked:

1. The start of the Second Chechen War was not the result of nationalistic policies pursued by Putin ahead of elections, but directly caused by the Chechens’ outright war against neighboring Russian territories.

2. The ‘political solution’ to the conflict that is so often touted was not a possibility against the backdrop of chaos and terrorism being spread by rebel commanders prior to the start of the second war.

3. The violence and terrorist acts throughout Russia that are repeatedly blamed on Putin’s Chechnya policy were already occurring before the war’s beginning.

4. Predictions for the Chechen war spreading throughout the entire region, or for the ‘Chechenization’ of the Caucasus, are largely unfounded and fail to take into account critical facts of the situation in neighboring republics.

5. Despite the much-deserved criticism directed at the local Kadyrov regime, the recent parliamentary elections are a major step toward genuine democracy and stability in Chechnya.

The Start of the War

What is almost never emphasized in reports about Chechnya is the cause of the present war: it was the Chechens who attacked Russia in August of 1999 to begin the Second Chechen War. After the signing of the Khasavyurt Treaty on August 31st, 1996 by General Alexander Lebed and Aslan Maskhadov, Chechnya de-facto earned its long-sought independence. Russian military and law enforcement units were withdrawn from Chechen soil, internationally recognized elections that solidified Maskhadov’s role as leader of Chechnya were held and, what is almost never mentioned, Russia continued to provide free gas and electricity supplies to Chechnya, as well as pay pensions to its elderly. The question of Chechnya’s official political status was postponed for five years.

By various accounts, including Paul Klebnikov’s notable book Godfather of the Kremlin, Chechnya descended into a state of virtual anarchy following Russia’s withdrawal, with President Maskhadov being unable to wrestle control from the various warlords ruling Chechnya’s territory. In the capital itself, an open slave market operated across the street from the Presidential Palace. The region became a haven for illicit arms and drug trade. The rebel commanders who had so zealously fought for Chechnya’s freedom proved themselves completely incapable of rebuilding any type of national economy or establishing rule of law.

Realizing they had failed, the rebels launched an offensive against Russia. This time they promised to occupy all territories south of the Black Sea (to which they had no historical or ethnic claim). By various estimates armies containing over 2,000 or 3,000 rebels attacked the neighboring Russian region of Dagestan in August of 1999, taking control of several villages. Under the orders of the then Prime Minister Sergei Stepashin, the Russian army successfully repelled the terrorists. The Chechens, under the leadership of notorious warlord Shamil Basayev, led a second major invasion. Only after this did the Russian army pursue the warlords back onto their own territory.

Politics: out of the question

When the incoming prime minister Putin ordered the start of the Second Chechen War, the Russian military had already bombed Chechen military compounds as a warning against further aggression and received President Maskhadov’s refusal to extradite Basayev. A political solution within such a context was not an option. Whether Maskhadov or other internal ‘political factions’ had supported the war against Russia is irrelevant – Russian citizens were being slaughtered on their own territory by invading Chechen armies.

Many analysts chose to portray Maskhadov as a benevolent peacemaker, a symbol of the Chechens’ struggle for freedom. In fact, he could more accurately be called a “piece-maker.” Regardless of what his intentions were, Mr. Maskhadov completely failed to bring any semblance of order or prosperity to Chechnya during his reign. The Second Chechen War began with chaos within the republic and his own subordinates leading a war against the neighboring Russian population. Putin asked him to extradite those responsible; instead Maskhadov’s government initially refused to even admit that an invasion of Dagestan was taking place. When he was faced with the choice of acknowledging his own failure or joining the ranks of terrorists, Maskhadov chose the latter. A number of other prominent rebels from the first war, like the Mufti of Chechnya Akhmad-Khadji Kadyrov, did not.

The Caucasus on Fire

In fact, the invasion of Dagestan in August of 1999 had not been the first attack on Russia by such terrorists during Mr. Maskhadov’s rule. The Chechen warlords had long made a lucrative business of kidnapping hostages and demanding ransoms. In May of 1998, Russia’s presidential representative to Chechnya was kidnapped and held for six months before being ruthlessly slaughtered. Later that year, four engineers from Britain and New Zealand were executed by Chechen terrorists. A market blast in the Russian city of Vladikavkaz in March of 1999 claimed the lives of 57 people, while the feared commander Salman Raduyev made no secret of his plan to carry out an attack on a Russian nuclear plant in the near future. The terrorist acts that are today so often blamed on Putin’s Chechnya policies are, in fact, merely continuations of the massacres Chechen terrorists were carrying out long before Mr. Putin appeared on the national political scene. They were connected not to any independence movement (independence had already been achieved in 1996), but to the rebels’ inability to form a stable government or working economy and to Mr. Maskhadov’s personal weakness at dealing with terrorists on his own territory.

We must keep this in mind when analyzing the Kremlin’s current role in Chechnya, especially in regards to establishing democracy. In his December 21st, 2005 Moscow Times article, Svante E. Cornell attacked Putin’s policies, writing that “the [recent parliamentary] elections [did] nothing to improve the deadlock in Chechnya and the rapidly deteriorating situation in the North Caucasus as a whole.” However, he also acknowledged that “the human and material destruction and the collapse of civic norms and values [in Chechnya] have undercut the very functioning of society, creating a fertile breeding ground for radicalism among a young generation that has known nothing but violence and deprivation.”

In this lies the key to understanding Putin’s strategy for Chechnya: a genuine democracy can only function with the presence of a number of critical institutions. Democracy is dependent upon civil society – people respecting the system that governs them, willing to obey the laws and to protect their own rights as well as those of others. When citizens are struggling to survive, they cannot be expected to care about their responsibilities before society.

In Chechnya basic security continues to be a major problem today, to say nothing of the poverty of the region or the complete absence of a middle class. This lack of security was present long before Mr. Putin initiated his Chechnya policy and was spreading from the boundaries of Chechnya to the entire Caucasus, culminating in the invasions of Dagestan in 1999. Before democracy could take shape, security needed to be guaranteed, and this is exactly the policy Putin has pursued.

This last year has seen substantial progress toward peace: the number of Russian military casualties in the republic has decreased by several times, as has the number of kidnappings. In fact, the Russian federal army had just 28 casualties in Chechnya in all of 2005. An explosion taking the lives of 14 civilians in July of last year received national attention, with Chechen President Alu Alkhanov personally visiting the site of the terrorist act. Such recognition would have been unimaginable just a few years ago, when analogous events occurred almost daily and were too numerous to receive much attention. Oksana Yablokova, in a December 20th, 2005 Moscow Times article, asserted that the recent UN and EU’s parallel decisions to focus assistance to the North Caucasus toward stimulating the regional economies and creating jobs, rather than giving direct food and medical aid, represents the international bodies’ recognition of the increasing stabilization of the area. Just recently, the South Korean conglomerate Samsung announced its serious consideration of establishing a gold production facility in the Caucasus republic of Karachayevo-Cherkessia. Such a move would pour serious investments into the depressed region.

Chechenization

Opponents are always keen to assert that the Chechen conflict is, in fact, spreading to other parts of the Caucasus. One of the most violent such events was the raid on the Ingush city of Nazran in June of 2004, in which over 90 civilians and law enforcement officials were killed. A similar raid occurred on the city of Nalchik in October of this year. What very few reports articulated was how much more successfully law enforcement officials responded to the second raid. The rebels failed to take any of their six strategic targets in the city other than a sporting goods store, less than 40 civilians and police were killed and over 90 terrorists were eliminated by Russian forces. A number of publications simply combined the total casualties of rebels and Russian forces during the second raid and compared those to the civilian casualties of the first. In fact, Shamil Basayev himself acknowledged in an interview that the second raid had been a blunder. The response to the Nalchik raid, as well as the relative serenity of the Caucasus during the last few months, leaves hope that the combined efforts of the Kremlin and of local officials will lead to peace in the region.

Another favorite accusation of Putin’s opponents is that the neighboring Russian republic of Dagestan is on the brink of a Chechen-style civil war. One notorious Nezavisimaya Gazeta headline in June of last year even pronounced: “Dagestan – the Second Chechnya.” These assertions are not entirely unfounded: 10 special forces soldiers were killed in Dagestan last July when a truck carrying them to a bathhouse exploded. An explosion in the capital Makhachkala in early September killed four people, and that same month saw another explosion at a roadside checkpoint and the assassination of a local administrative head. In fact Dagestan experienced over 70 terrorist attacks during the first half of 2005, albeit most of them very minor, which was more than in any other Russian region, including Chechnya.

These statistics led to serious attention from top people in the Kremlin. Following the Beslan attack, one of Putin’s closest allies, Dmitry Kozak, has been personally overseeing the stabilization program in the Caucasus as the president’s representative to the Southern Federal District. In a report leaked in June to a prominent Moscow newspaper, Kozak underlined his thorough familiarity with the situation in Dagestan and concern for the republic’s wellbeing. Since September Dagestan has noticeably quieted down, with no major terrorist attacks having been reported. In February of 2006, the ailing 75-year-old leader of the republic, Magomedali Magomedov, finally stepped down, clearing the way for the prominent speaker of parliament, Mukhu Aliyev, to become the republic’s first president. Even the Kremlin’s harshest critics admit that Aliyev is an uncorrupted leader familiar with the situation in Dagestan. The explosion of violence and clan warfare that some publications predicted would follow the transfer of power in Dagestan never occurred.

Those predicting a Chechen-style independence movement in Dagestan are ignoring several critical facts that differentiate the republic from its western neighbor. The original Chechen independence movement came as a result of large-scale, ethnically-motivated calls for separation. Over two thirds of population of Chechnya is ethnic Chechen. Dagestan, however, is much more diverse with over 30 ethnic groups, the major ones being the Avars and Dargins. No one group has anything close to a clear majority of the total population, hence a republic-wide independence movement on ethnic grounds similar to that of Chechnya’s is simply impossible. In fact the significance of February’s change of authority in Dagestan lies in the fact that Magomedov, an ethnic Dargin, transferred his power to Aliyev, an Avar, leaving hope that the relatively peaceful coexistence of the two major groups during the 20th century can continue. Furthermore Chechnya is an oil-rich region that had good prospects for establishing its own functioning economy during its independence movement. Dagestan, however, is a predominantly agricultural region, with over 70% of the republican budget being subsidized by Moscow. The people of Dagestan understand this, and hence have little desire to politically separate from Russia and see that money disappear.

Hope for Peace

One of the most promising signs that the situation in the Caucasus is stabilizing is the Kremlin’s progressive position on the issue. Putin and a number of key government officials have emphasized repeatedly that terrorism is merely a symptom, that the actual problem is poverty throughout the region. Anyone who saw Putin’s recent address to the Chechen parliament during his surprise visit to Grozny will agree that it was one of the most emotional speeches he has ever made during his political career. Putin admitted before the Chechen people the atrocities that Russia had committed on their land; he reiterated that the rebellion did not appear out of nowhere, but occurred largely because of Russia’s past abuses against the Chechens.

Unfortunately, massive violations of human rights, particularly kidnappings, continue in the republic. Neither the local authorities nor the Kremlin deny this. Chechnya has been rife with war and destitution for the last 10 years, leaving us to hope for a gradual improvement in the situation through a return to normalcy. The increasing stability in the republic has allowed for parliamentary elections, which is a major step toward democracy. The former defense minister in Maskhadov’s government (Khambiev) ran with an opposition party (SPS) and won. To suggest that a high-ranking former rebel taking a seat in parliament from the opposition is not a part of a political solution to the Chechen conflict is absurd.

Much of the criticism the Kremlin receives in regards to Chechnya is undoubtedly necessary and often deserved. It would be much more constructive, however, to direct that criticism at specific issues in the republic that need to be resolved rather than to portray Putin as a warmonger and persecutor, to depict the war as the plot of a Tom Clancy novel, complete with heroes and villains. The European Union and United Nations have taken their first steps in this direction. We can hope that others will follow suit.

Works Cited

Abdullayev, Nabi. “Dagestan Confirms Aliyev as Republic’s First President.” TheMoscowTimes.com. 21 Feb. 2006. The Moscow Times. 5 Mar. 2006 <http://www.themoscowtimes.com/stories/2006/02/21/016.html>.

Cornell, Svante E. “A Virtual Election in a Fantasy Chechnya.” TheMoscowTimes.com. 21 Dec. 2005. The Moscow Times. 7 Mar. 2006 <http://www.themoscowtimes.com/stories/2005/12/21/006.html>.

Humber, Yuriy. “Samsung’s Bid for Gold in the Caucasus.” TheMoscowTimes.com. 28 Feb. 2006. The Moscow Times. 8 Mar. 2006 <http://www.themoscowtimes.com/stories/2006/02/28/003.html>.

Klebnikov, Paul. Godfather of the Kremlin: The Decline of Russia in the Age of Gangster Capitalism. United States of America: Harcourt, Inc., 2000.

Latynina, Yulia. “Dagestan Needs More Than a New Leader.” TheMoscowTimes.com. 22 Feb. 2006. The Moscow Times. 7 Mar. 2006 < http://www.themoscowtimes.com/stories/2006/02/22/007.html>.

Liss, Artyom. “Dark shadows in ‘normal’ Chechnya.” BBC News. 27 Feb. 2006. BBC. 9 Mar. 2006 <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4757274.stm>.

Maksakov, Ilya. “The Chance to Make a Choice.” Russia Profile. Dec. 2005: 7-8.

“Russia says rebel assault over; toll tops 100.” MSNBC.com. 14 Oct. 2005. MSNBC. 6 Mar. 2006 <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/9681595>.

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Walker, Shaun. “Dagestan – On the Edge.” Russia Profile. Oct. 2005: 8-10.

Yablokova, Oksana. “UN, EU Aim to Revive Caucasus Economy.” TheMoscowTimes.com. 20 Dec. 2005. The Moscow Times. 8 Jan. 2006 <http://www.themoscowtimes.com/stories/2005/12/20/002.html>.